

Causality in the Time of Cholera: John Snow as a Prototype for Causal Inference

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[*Snow & Causal Inference*]

[Coleman]

[Feb 2020]

What Causes Cholera? Hugely Important in 1850s London



Horrendous way to die – dehydration, convulsions, blue skin, die within hours

Scourge of mid-1800s London – 1831-32 6,526 dead; 1849 14,137; 1853-54 10,738

Massive uncertainty as to cause

- Bad air (miasma); bad breeding (poverty); bad ground (plague pits)

Huge public health & policy question – and one man knew the answer:

- John Snow & bad water – effort to prove contaminated water as causal agent

Image:

- https://wellcomeimages.org/indexplus/obf_images/6e/39/38b7c365914565dbd94fdf33b9ba.jpg
- Gallery: <https://wellcomeimages.org/indexplus/image/V0010484.html>
- Wellcome Collection gallery (2018-03-21): <https://wellcomecollection.org/works/acghney7> CC-BY-4.0

Why John Snow and 1850s Cholera?

Three reasons:

- I. **Rollicking Good Tale** – full of heroism, death, and statistics
- II. **Causal Inference** – template for how to marshal evidence in support of a causal explanation
- III. **Statistics & Instruction** – The data are simple but the analysis demonstrates multiple data analytic tools we use today
 - combining maps and data (GIS or geographic information systems)
 - regression and error analysis
 - difference-in-differences regression
 - natural experiments and randomization

Snow's cholera work is also a humbling reminder of the sometimes meandering path towards truth: even with overwhelming evidence and strong analysis Snow failed to convince the medical establishment, the public, or the authorities

[Angrist and Pischke(2008)] p. ? credit Snow with the first application of Differences-in-Differences.

[Angrist and Pischke(2014)] discusses Snow p. 205 ff and reproduces Snow's Table XII.

[Greene()] p 228 calls this IV but I think it's not best thought of as IV.

Prototype for Building a Causal Argument

David Freedman extols Snow's research methodology:

a success story for scientific reasoning based on nonexperimental data

but derogates regression and statistical testing:

regression models are not a particularly good way of doing empirical work in the social sciences today ("Statistical Models & Shoe Leather" 1991)

This paper:

- Endorses and expands on Snow as an example of good scientific reasoning
- Lays out Snow's approach as a template for causal inference, a prototype with valuable guidelines for practitioners
- Argues that statistics (regression in particular) must be added to Snow's analysis – without a statistical foundation the causal argument is incomplete

"Snow's work is ... a success story for scientific reasoning based on nonexperimental data." ([Freedman(1991)] p 291)

"statistical technique can seldom be an adequate substitute for good design, relevant data, and testing predictions against reality in a variety of settings," ([Freedman(1991)] p 291)

"regression models are not a particularly good way of doing empirical work in the social sciences today" ([Freedman(1991)] p. 304).

"Snow's work exemplifies one point on a continuum of research styles; the regression examples mark another" (p. 304).

Outline

Contents

1 Overview: John Snow and the Story of Cholera

1.1 Cholera, John Snow, and Waterborne Theory

Cholera – Disease of Poor Sanitation

What is Cholera?

- Vibrio Cholerae – bacterium that infects the small intestine of humans
- Causes severe diarrhea (& vomiting) that drains fluids
- Death from dehydration & organ failure
- Oral Rehydration Therapy highly successful (roughly 1960s)
 - In case you ever need it, here's the recipe – 1 liter boiled water, 1/2 teaspoon salt, 6 teaspoons sugar, mashed banana (potassium)

Cholera thrives in crowded cities with poor sanitation

- Transmitted through recycling (drinking) sewage
- When cholera exits one victim, needs to find a way into gut of others
- Victorian London was an ideal playground for cholera to thrive


Cholera Loved Victorian London

Victorian London was an ideal playground for cholera

- Mid-1800s London was dirty, smelly place with no organized sewage treatment
- Efforts to improve sanitation made things worse
 - cesspools relatively safe – did not provide access to thousands of guts
- Public Health Act of 1848 required houses to connect to sewage lines
 - helped clean up streets, flushed filth to Thames
- By mid-1800s, cholera had easy access from the gut of one to thousands of victims

Contemporaries were aware of dirty water (*Punch* 1849)

- But water not recognized as vector for cholera



Contemporary cartoon from Punch, 1849

- <http://www.choleraandthethames.co.uk/cholera-in-london/the-big-thames-clean-up/>, 1849 Punch magazine, volume 17 Westminster City Archives

Solution – Construction of Bazalgette “Outfall Sewers”

Sewers that sloped towards outfalls (discharge points) lower on the Thames

- Construction started (under Bazalgette) 1859, response to 1858 “Great Stink”
- Embankments along Thames – what we see today
 - Embedded discharge pipes – still used today (?)
 - Decreased width, increased flow – scouring effect
- Moved sewage downstream, below London & water in-take



One final outbreak, 1866, limited to east London, last area unserved by sewers

John Snow’s Research & Publications

Doctor – pioneer in anesthesia & medical hygiene

- Provided Queen Victoria with anesthesia during childbirth

Research and writing on Cholera

- 1849: “On the Mode of Communication of Cholera”
 - Laid out theory and evidence for waterborne transmission
- 1855: “On the Mode of Communication of Cholera”
 - Substantially expanded, additional evidence and argument
- 1856: “Cholera and the water supply in the south district of London in 1854”
 - Refined randomized analysis

John Snow's 1849 Theory & 1855 Evidence

1849: Snow developed theory of infection & transmission

- Based on medical knowledge and study of single events – Horsleydown & Albion Terrace

Fully-developed & modern theory of disease

- Infects & reproduces in the small intestine
- Exits from victim, into water supply
- Infects new victims through drinking dirty water


Implications for patterns of infection, across scales

- “from the membrane of the small intestine all the way up to the city itself” (Johnson)

Snow's work grounded by theory

Snow had a good idea – a causal theory about how the disease spread – that guided the gathering and assessment of evidence. (Tuft)

1855: evidence & argument to convince skeptics



Johnson emphasizes role & importance of Snow's model:

The strength of his model derived from its ability to use observed phenomena on one scale to make predictions about behavior on other scales up and down the chain. ... If cholera were waterborne then the patterns of infection must correlate with the patterns of water distribution in London's neighborhoods. Snow's theory was like a ladder; each individual rung was impressive enough, but the power of it lay in ascending from bottom to top, from the membrane of the small intestine all the way up to the city itself. [Johnson(2007)] p. 148

Tuft:

Most importantly, Snow had a good idea – a causal theory about how the disease spread – that guided the gathering and assessment of evidence. This theory developed from medical analysis and empirical observation; by mapping earlier epidemics, Snow detected a link between different water supplies and varying rates of cholera. [Tuft(1997a), Tuft(1997b)] p. 7

The four components of Tufte's *good method*:

- I. Placing the data in an appropriate context for assessing cause and effect
- II. Making quantitative comparisons
- III. Considering alternative explanations and contrary cases
- IV. Assessment of possible errors in the numbers reported in graphics

Snow (1849):

The excretions of the sick at once suggest themselves as containing some material which, being accidentally swallowed, might attach itself to the mucous membrane of the small intestines, and there multiply itself by the appropriation of surrounding matter, in virtue of molecular changes going on within it, or capable of going on, as soon as it is placed in congenial circumstances. Such a mode of communication of disease is not without precedent. The ova of the intestinal worms are undoubtedly introduced in this way. The affections [sic] they induce are amongst the most chronic, whilst cholera is one of the most acute; but duration does not of itself destroy all analogy amongst organic processes. The writer, however, does not wish to be misunderstood as making this comparison so closely as to imply that cholera depends on veritable animals, or even animalcules, but rather to appeal to that general tendency to the continuity of molecular changes, by which combustion, putrefaction, fermentation, and the various processes in organized beings, are kept up. ([Snow(1849)] pp. 8-9)

Alternative Theories

Miasma (Smells & Airborne)

- Cholera infectious & transmitted through the air
- Generally accepted in mid-1800s

Elevation, Crowding & Class, Others

- Elevation: lower elevation → more infection
- Crowding & Class: lower class & crowding → more infection

None of these absolutely crazy – correlated with cholera (and dirty water)


- Raw sewage associated with bad smells & dirty drinking water
- Lower class associated with crowding & poor sanitation

Other non-infectious theories (I won't seriously consider)

- Emanations from the ground
- Plague burying-pit near Broad Street pump

1.2 Data, Timeline, and Locations

Contents



History of Cholera

- Chronology of cholera <http://www.choleraandthethames.co.uk>
 - 1817 first outbreak from modern pandemic, India, China, Japan, ...
 - 1823 first dies down in Caucuses before reaching Europe
 - 1826-27, 2nd pandemic, moves to Russia, Poland, Europe
 - 1831-32, First England (Sunderland), 6,536 die
 - 1848-49 2nd English outbreak, 14,137 die
 - 1849 Albion Terrace
 - 1853-54 3rd English outbreak, 10,738 die
 - * Aug-Sep 1854, Soho (Broad St) outbreak
 - 1866 4th & last outbreak, limited to east of London (the rest of London not strongly affected)
- John Snow chronology
 - 1838 John Snow qualifies as doctor
 - 1847 “On the Inhalation of Ether”
 - 1849 Albion Terrace outbreak – event from which Snow developed waterborne theory
 - 1849 omcc 1st ed published
 - Aug-Sep 1854, Soho (Broad St) outbreak
 - Aug-winter 1854 South London “Grand Experiment”
 - Jan 1855, omcc 2nd ed published
 - October 1856 “Cholera and the water supply in the south district of London in 1854”
 - June 1858 Snow dies
- Other events
 - 1848, (Public Health Act of 1848) sewers and cesspools must be connected to lines, dumping into Thames
 - July 1858, Great Stink that precipitated new sewer bypass
 - 1859, start of Bazalgette sewer system – Northern & Southern Outfall Sewers to discharge lower on the Thames (thus cleaning up the Thames and London’s water supply)

I discuss Three Strands or “Blocks” of Evidence

I. Albion Terrace

- 1849, Discovery of waterborne theory
- single event, 17 houses

II. Broad Street Outbreak

- Aug-Sep 1854, 700 deaths over roughly 2 weeks, 10 square blocks

III. South London “Grand Experiment”

- Summer & Fall 1854, customers supplied by two water companies
- large scale, 400k mixed (quasi-random) subjects


Data or Evidence Blocks

Albion Terr
17 houses
single outbreak

Broad St
~10 sq blocks
2wks, 700 deaths

South London
summer/fall 1854
~400k subjects mixed
treated & untreated

Locations of Events & Data



2 John Snow's Evidence & Causal Inference

Contents

Modify Katz & Singer as "Causal Assessment Procedure"

Still tentative, based on Katz & Singer's analysis of possible Chemical & Biological Weapons attacks, 1970s-80s, "Can an Attribution Assessment Be Made for Yellow Rain?"

- I. Divide evidence into blocks or types of evidence
- II. Assign to each block a *veritas* rating – quality of data
- III. Develop groups of hypotheses
- IV. Assess each evidence block for strength of rejection for each hypothesis
 - Consider *rejection* of hypotheses (refute, neutral, consistent) rather than strength of association (support of hypotheses)
- V. Organize evidence blocks by hypothesis into matrix
- VI. Choose hypothesis not contradicted
- VII. Strongest hypothesis checked

[Katz and Singer(2007)]

What to call this?

- Causal Checklist
- Causal Engine
- Causal Matrix
- Causal Assessment Engine

Seven Step from Katz & Singer

- I. Divide evidence into blocks or types of evidence
- II. Assign to each block a *veritas* rating
 - Degree of dubiousness (strength of evidence - "appraisal of intrinsic ambiguity or likelihood")
 - 1-3, high, moderate, minimal distortion
 - Degree of fallacy ("appraisal of deception")
 - "the extent to which a piece of evidence was deceptive, misleading, or the result of unreliable reasoning"
 - 1, event probability low and evidence doubtful
 - 2, supporting information accurate but event low probability
 - 3, accepted evidence but doubted piece
 - 4, accepted all evidence as probably accurate
 - But for the cholera example, I think this less relevant and need to emphasize (4) below.
- III. Develop groups of hypotheses

IV. Assess each evidence block for strength of association to each hypothesis

- Strong, medium, weak
- For Snow & cholera, think about inverting and making it about contradicting or refuting hypothesis (maybe strong, neutral, fail-to-refute)
- Maybe need two dimensions?
 - Strength of evidence: strong, medium, weak (this is p-value for statistical tests)
 - Whether contradicts hypothesis or not (maybe strong, neutral, fail-to-refute)


V. Organize evidence blocks by hypothesis into matrix

VI. Choose strongest hypothesis

- based on quality of evidence, quantity of evidence, strength of explanation based on evidence
- each block assigned numerical score based on coding scheme (strength of association & veritas rating)

VII. Strongest hypothesis checked

- agreed with overall state of historical and scientific knowledge
- satisfies guidelines for causation
- consistent with any definitive proof or admission (not applicable for economic problems, I think)



Overview of Snow's Evidence & Argument

Model-based

The strength of his model derived from its ability to use observed phenomena on one scale to make predictions about behavior on other scales up and down the chain. ... If cholera were waterborne then the patterns of infection must correlate with the patterns of water distribution in London's neighborhoods. Snow's theory was like a ladder; each individual rung was impressive enough, but the power of it lay in ascending from bottom to top, from the membrane of the small intestine all the way up to the city itself. ([Johnson(2007)] p. 148)

Multiple evidence

- I. Case study with attention to individual circumstances
- II. Large-scale statistical study

It is remarkable that, of the two suppositions, first, that the air alone, and secondly, that the water more especially, was concerned in exciting the disease, whilst the former appears less and less equal to explain individual cases in proportion as these are examined more and more in detail, it is precisely in the variety and exactitude of its particular application to individual facts that the latter finds its most positive support. ([Westminster and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine(1855)] p. 81)

3 Albion Terrace – “Discovery” of Theory

Contents

Albion Terrace Details, 1849

Terrace of 17 houses in South London (Wandsworth Road)

- Snow focused on this outbreak because no cases in surrounding houses

there were no other cases at the time in the immediate neighbourhood; the houses opposite to, behind, and in the same line, at each end of those in which the disease prevailed, having been free from it. (Snow 1849 p 15)

Provided sharp test of how & why cholera spread

- Assistant-Surveyor for Commission of Sewers dug up and studied piping
- Storm July 26, drain burst and contaminated water for all 17 houses

the only special and peculiar cause ... was the state of the water, which was followed by the cholera in almost every house to which it extended, whilst all the surrounding houses were quite free from the disease. (Snow 1855 p 30)

Provided Snow with final evidence that crystalized his theory

Within the last few days, however, some occurrences have come within [the author's] knowledge which seem to offer more direct proof, and have induced him to take the present course [publishing]. (Snow 1849 p 12)

Not enough to convince skeptics


Details on Albion Terrace: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/1859map/albionterraceoutbreak_1849_a3.html

Albion Terrace was a row of 17 houses that suffered “an extraordinary mortality from Cholera in 1849, which was the more striking as there were no other cases at the time in the immediate neighbourhood; the houses opposite to, behind, and in the same line, at each end of those in which the disease prevailed, having been free from it.” Snow described in detail the outbreak (reporting findings from Mr. Grant, the Assistant-Surveyor for the Commission of Sewers), and the piping for water supply and sewage disposal from the Albion Terrace houses and the circumstances that led to contamination of their water supply but not others – how “the water got contaminated by the contents of the house-drains and cesspools; the cholera extended to nearly all the houses in which the water was thus tainted, and to no others.” ([Snow(1849)] p 15 ff, also [Snow(1855)] p 30

It remains evident then, that the only special and peculiar cause connected with the great calamity which befel the inhabitants of these houses, was the state of the water, which was followed by the cholera in almost every house to which it extended, whilst all the surrounding houses were quite free from the disease. ([Snow(1855)] p 30)

Schematic of Cesspools & Water Tanks

17 houses sharing common water source



from "Cholera, Chloroform, and the Science of Medicine", Vinten-Johansen et al.

- Storms July 26 & Aug 2nd, burst pipes and mixed cesspool with drinking water
- All 17 shared same water source, so all contaminated
- No surrounding houses affected

4 Broad Street Pump – Famous for “The Map”

Contents

Broad Street – 2 Weeks of Horrendous Death

The most terrible outbreak of cholera which ever occurred in this kingdom, is probably that which took place in Broad Street, Golden Square, and the adjoining streets ... there were upwards of five hundred fatal attacks of cholera in ten days. (Snow 1855 p. 38)

Outbreak erupted Aug 29, lasted 2-3 weeks

- Ultimately, more than 600 dead
- Limited to small neighborhood in Soho (south of Carnaby St, east of Regent St)
- Sudden, violent, dramatic outbreak

Snow lived nearby, quickly went to neighborhood to investigate

- Walked the streets, talked with and collected data from residents

Visited last June

- John Snow pub



The most terrible outbreak of cholera which ever occurred in this kingdom, is probably that which took place in Broad Street, Golden Square, and the adjoining streets, a few weeks ago. Within two hundred and fifty yards of the spot where Cambridge Street joins Broad Street, there were upwards of five hundred fatal attacks of cholera in ten days. ([Snow(1855)] p. 38)

Tufte – The Classic Story of Snow’s Map

Tufte highlights aspects of Snow’s analysis

- A *good idea* – a theory.
- “A shrewd intelligence about evidence, a clear logic of data display and analysis”
- A *good method*

Tufte emphasize four components of *good method*:


- I. Placing the data in an appropriate context for assessing cause and effect
- II. Making quantitative comparisons
- III. Considering alternative explanations and contrary cases
- IV. Assessment of possible errors in the numbers reported in graphics

that I compress into three: Mapping; Cases & Anomalies; Quantitative & Statistics (with my contingency table contribution)

Broad Street Pump Analysis – 3 Parts

Mapping

- Discovery & explication
 - localizing outbreak
 - making visible what is hidden



- Icon: encapsulating and promoting waterborne theory

Narratives, Case Studies, Anomalies

- Narrative & Tracking Individual Cases
- Exceptions & Anomalies: “Snow knew that the case would be made in the exceptions from the norm.” (Johnson p 140)

Quantitative & Statistics (also Whitehead, extending Snow)

- Statistical Tests of Clustering
- Contingency Testing – Drinkers vs Non-Drinkers and Survivorship Bias

4.1 Mapping & Tufte's Narrative


Contents

Snow's Data: Raw List → Time Series → Map

Placing the data in an appropriate context for assessing cause and effect

The raw data were a list of deaths by date – Virtually useless,

So recast as time-series, which at least shows there was an epidemic



“descriptive narration is not causal explanation” (Tufte p 7)

Note for later: pump-handle off on Sep 8 – after peak

The analysis of Tufte ([Tufte(1997a), Tufte(1997b)])

“Deaths from Cholera” produced using software from [Li()]. Map from [Snow(1855)], copied from <http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/snowmap1.pdf>

[Snow] could see at a glance that he'd be able to demonstrate that the outbreak was clustered around the pump, yet he knew from experience that that kind of evidence, on its own, would not satisfy a miasmatist. The cluster could just as easily reflect some pocket of poisoned air that had settled over that part of Soho, something emanating from the gully holes or cesspools – or perhaps even from the pump itself. Snow knew that the case would be made in the exceptions from the norm. Pockets of life where you could expect death, pockets of death where you would expect life. [Johnson(2007)] p. 140

The map may not have had the impact on its immediate audience that Snow would have liked, but something about it reverberated in the culture. Like the cholera itself, it had a certain quality that made people inclined to reproduce it, and through that reproduction, the map spread the waterborne theory more broadly. In the long run, the map was a triumph of marketing as much as empirical science. It helped a good idea find a wide audience. ([Johnson(2007)] p. 199)

Snow's Maps – Analysis & Convincing Display

Snow identified the pump just by walking the streets:

On proceeding to the spot, I found that nearly all of the deaths had taken place within a short distance of the pump (Snow p 39)

But Snow needed more – a way to make it jump out to others

he knew ... that that kind of evidence, on its own, would not satisfy a miasmatist. The cluster could just as easily reflect some pocket of poisoned air that had settled over that part of Soho (Johnson p 140)

Snow was not the first to map the outbreak – Edmund Cooper, Metropolitan Commission of Sewers first


- Partly in response to concerns about Plague Pit, sewer line digging

Cooper's map was too busy, too much information

He could see at a glance that he'd be able to demonstrate that the outbreak was clustered around the pump, yet he knew from experience that that kind of evidence, on its own, would not satisfy a miasmatist. The cluster could just as easily reflect some pocket of poisoned air that had settled over that part of Soho, something emanating from the gully holes or cesspools – or perhaps even from the pump itself. Snow knew that the case would be made in the exceptions from the norm. Pockets of life where you could expect death, pockets of death where you would expect life. [Johnson(2007)] p. 140

Snow did not draw a map until December, 1854; the first spot map was produced in September of that year by Edmund Cooper, an engineer for the Metropolitan Commission of Sewers (see figure 3) [12]. Cooper's investigation resulted from public complaints linking the sewers to the cholera outbreak. Rumors held sway that sewer works had disturbed the soil of an ancient pit where bodies had been buried during the plague of 1665. Many feared that this process had freed or generated noxious gases that caused the cholera. Some alleged further that cholera deaths had been especially numerous in houses next to gully-holes, the openings through which sewer gases were vented to the surface. [Frerichs()], <http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/mapmyth/mapmyth3.html>


Cooper's Map Obscures: Too Much Detail



Cooper, from Vinten-Johansen at al Figure 12.4

Snow was Masterful, Stripping Out Extraneous Detail

Dot-Map demonstrates centrality of Broad Street pump



Snow's great contribution was to simplify & clarify – highlight the deaths and the pumps
Snow 1855

- Deaths & pumps only
- Deaths dark bars, pumps clearly marked

Clustering around pump jumps out

Pump Jumps Out



More mapping (quantitative analysis): mappingQuantAnalysismappingQuantAnalysis

4.2 Case Studies & Narrative: Tracking Individual Cases & Anomalies

Contents

There is a brewery in Broad Street, near to the pump, and on perceiving that no brewer's men were registered as having died of cholera, I called on Mr. Huggins, the proprietor. He informed me that there were above seventy workmen employed in the brewery, and that none of them had suffered from cholera—at least in severe form—only two having been indisposed, and that not seriously, at the time the disease prevailed. The men are

allowed a certain quantity of malt liquor, and Mr. Huggins believes they do not drink water at all; and he is quite certain that the workmen never obtained water from the pump in the street. There is a deep well in the brewery, in addition to the New River water. ([Snow(1855)] p. 42)

The Workhouse in Poland Street is more than three-fourths surrounded by houses in which deaths from cholera occurred, yet out of five-hundred-thirty-five inmates only five died of cholera, the other deaths which took place being those of persons admitted after they were attacked. The workhouse has a pump-well on the premises, in addition to the supply from the Grand Junction Water Works, and the inmates never sent to Broad Street for water. If the mortality in the workhouse had been equal to that in the streets immediately surrounding it on three sides, upwards of one hundred persons would have died. ([Snow(1855)]p. 42)

Dr. Fraser also first called my attention to the following circumstances, which are perhaps the most conclusive of all in proving the connexion between the Broad Street pump and the outbreak of cholera. In the ‘Weekly Return of Births and Deaths’ of September 9th, the following death is recorded: ‘At West End [Hampstead], on 2nd September, the widow of a percussion-cap maker, aged 59 years, diarrhea two hours, cholera epidemica sixteen hours.’ I was informed by this lady’s son that she had not been in the neighbourhood of Broad Street for many months. A cart went from Broad Street to West End every day, and it was the custom to take out a large bottle of the water from the pump in Broad Street, as she preferred it. The water was taken on Thursday, 31st August, and she drank of it in the evening, and also on Friday. She was seized with cholera on the evening of the latter day, and died on Saturday. . . . A niece, who was on a visit to this lady, also drank of the water; she returned to her residence, in a high and healthy part of Islington, was attacked with cholera, and died also. There was no cholera at the time, either at West End or in the neighbourhood where the niece died. ([Snow(1855)] p 44-45, quoted in [Tuft(1997a)] p 10)

Tufte 3: Alternative Explanations & Contrary Cases

More Important than Map: Narratives & Anomalous Cases

Testing Competing Theories: “confronting the waterborne and alternative theories with evidence”

I. Those who should have died but escaped

- Close to pump but did not die
- Work House & Brewery (few-to-no deaths)

II. Those who should have escaped but died

- Far from the pump but died
- Marlborough St pump and 10 Cross St (“great drinkers of pump water”)
- Girls from the south – Ham Yard & Angel Ct – off Great Windmill St, near Bridle Street, Rupert Street, or Tichborne St pumps
- Susannah Eley, famous “Widow in Hampstead”

III. Details on the mechanism for contamination of the pump-well

- Index case and decaying brick-work

Story about removing pump-handle on September 7 – did not stop outbreak which was already falling quickly (see graph)

Discuss more “anecdotal” evidence

Structuring Snow’s evidence as “confronting the waterborne and alternative theories with evidence”

I. Those who should have died but escaped – Those close to pump who did not die

- Work House & Brewery

The St. James workhouse on Poland Street had 535 inmates with only five dying. As Snow points out ([Snow(1855)] p 42) if the death rate had been as high for the workhouse as the surrounding houses more than 100 would have died. The explanation was simple: the workhouse had its own well and was also supplied by piped water (from the Grand Junction Water Works); residents did not visit the Broad Street pump.

For the brewery (the Lion Brewery) the same problem and explanation hold: seventy workmen but no cases of cholera, but the workmen were “allowed a certain quantity of malt liquor,” had access to an in-house well, and never drank from the pump.

II. Those who should have escaped but died – Those far from the pump who nonetheless died

- Marlborough St and 10 Cross St
- Girls from the south - Ham Yard & Angel Ct - off Great Windmill St, near Bridle Street, Rupert Street, or Tichborne St pumps
- Susannah Eley

A fair number of deaths cluster near the Little Marlborough Street pump, nearer Marlborough than Broad Street. This should not be the case if water were the cause (and with the auxiliary hypothesis that residents drink from the closest pump). But Snow states:

It requires to be stated that the water of the pump in Marlborough Street, at the end of Carnaby Street, was so impure that many people avoided using it. And I found that the persons who died near this pump in the beginning of September, had water from the Broad Street pump. ([Snow(1855)] p 46)

There is a cluster of eight deaths at 10 Cross Street, closer to Marlborough than Broad Street. Their story is told in the Vestry report: a tailor aged 50 and his 12 year-old son died September 1st, and within three days four more of his children, all “great drinkers of pump water” who often drank from the Broad Street pump.¹

Two little girls (one from Ham Yard the other from Angel Court, both off Great Windmill Street far to the south of Broad Street) went to school in Durfours Place (off Broad Street) and drank from the Broad Street pump on the way to or from school. ([Westminster and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine(1855)] pp 112-113)

One of the most famous cases concerned Susannah Eley, a widow in Hampstead and her niece in Islington who died in early September when there were no other cholera deaths in those areas.² Snow discovered from the widow’s sons, who owned a factory at 37 Broad Street near the pump, that she had lived in Soho, thought the Broad Street pump water delicious, and regularly had water from the pump brought to her in Hampstead. Both she and her niece drank Broad Street water the day before falling ill ([Snow(1855)] pp 44-45, also discussed in [Tuft(1997b), Johnson(2007)], [Hempel(2007)] p 217 ff as well as others).

III. Details on the mechanism for contamination of the pump-well – The index case and decaying brick-work

Whitehead identified a baby girl Frances Lewis at 40 Broad Street, the building next to the pump, who had fallen sick a day prior to the outbreak (and died September 2nd). Sarah Lewis, the mother, had rinsed diapers and poured the water into a cesspool at the front of the house.

¹“This family were great drinkers of pump water, and used to send for it every day, but more especially to drink during the night, as they were thirsty in the warm weather, owing to the great number sleeping in one room. The children fetched the water from various pumps, but frequently from Broad Street.” [Westminster and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine(1855)] p 112

²Snow credits a Dr. David Fraser for alerting him to these anomalous deaths.

The existence of the cesspool was unexpected (drains were supposed to be connected to sewer lines) and further inspection showed that the cesspool was only inches from the well, there was decaying brickwork, and the ground was saturated with water from the cesspool.

Story about removing pump-handle on September 7 – did not stop outbreak which was already falling quickly (see graph)

Imre Lakatos and “Protective Belt” of Auxiliary Hypotheses

Scientific theories and the evidence to reject them are difficult things

- Evidence rarely or never speaks clearly and unambiguously – few “definitive experiments”
- Theories built on both “Core” & “Auxiliary” (“protective belt”) hypotheses
- Evidence often rejects the (necessary) auxiliary hypotheses – core protected

We can only judge evidence in concert with judgement about theory

- Lakatos discusses Michelson Morley (speed-of-light) experiment
- Only in hindsight a “definitive” rejection of aether theory
- Many years’ debate over “auxiliary” hypotheses of aether drag, ...

Snow’s water-borne theory (and competitors) no different

- Must consider both core and auxiliary hypotheses
- Need to apply judgment to theory – data never speak unambiguously

Anomalies to Test & Separate Theories

- Water theory: evidence rejects neither core nor auxiliary
- Miasma: hard (but not impossible) to develop auxiliaries that protect core

(1) Close to pump but did not die

	Water 1	Water 2	Miasma 1	Miasma 2
Core	Drinking	Drinking	Breathing	Breathing
Auxiliary	P[drink ~ distance]	P[drink ~ in-house wells]	P[breath ~ distance]	P[breath ~ ??]
Implication	deaths ~ distance	deaths ~ distance & wells	deaths ~ distance	??
Core Refuted?	YES	NO	YES	??

Difficult to come up with Miasma auxiliary hypothesis to match spatial distribution

- Deaths follow drinking: Breathing pattern would need to correlate with drinking
- Could argue Snow did not search for auxiliary breathing hypothesis – but a stretch

(2) Far from pump but did die

	Water 1	Water 2	Miasma 1	Miasma 2
Core	Drinking	Drinking	Breathing	Breathing
Auxiliary	P[drink ~ distance]	People travel to Broad St	P[breath ~ distance]	Water infected by air
Implication	deaths ~ distance	deaths ~ taste for Broad St	deaths ~ distance	deaths ~ taste for Broad St
Core Refuted?	YES	NO	YES	NO

Water auxiliary: some people travel distances to Broad St pump

- Reasonable, fits naturally with known human behavior

Miasma auxiliary: water “participates in the atmospheric infection”

- To modern eyes, foolish and cooked up to support miasma
- Miasma protected by auxiliary hypothesis allowing miasma to match drinking patterns

We can only judge evidence in concert with judgement about theory

Lakatos (in [Lakatos(1980)], particularly section 1.3 p 47 ff) lays out the idea of a scientific research programme consisting of a “hard core” together with “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses built around the central core. Lakatos argues that anomalies or counterexamples can be accommodated by adjusting the protective belt rather than rejecting the hard core. In fact the death of Susannah Eley in the Broad Street outbreak (a widow from Hampstead discussed below) provides a near-perfect example. Her case is a strong counterexample to airborne transmission (miasma). Nonetheless the official Cholera Commission’s report dismisses the anomaly by invoking a strained hypothesis about airborne influences poisoning the water – an auxiliary hypothesis that we now recognize as outlandish.

Cholera Commission's Auxiliary Hypothesis

This is really too good to pass up:

*The water was undeniably impure with organic contamination; and ... if, at the times of epidemic invasion there was operating in the air some influence which converts putrefiable impurities into a specific poison, the water of the locality ... would probably be liable to similar poisonous conversion. Thus, **if the Broad Street pump did actually become a source of disease** to persons dwelling at a distance ... **this ... may have arisen**, not in its containing choleraic excrements, but **simply in the fact of its impure waters having participated in the atmospheric infection of the district.***

Wonderful example of Miasma auxiliary hypothesis to protect miasma core

- Demonstrates that virtually any “core” can be protected by “auxiliary”
- An auxiliary we now recognize as foolish, cooked up to protect Miasma
- Miasma protected by auxiliary hypothesis allowing miasma to match drinking patterns


[Johnson(2007)] p 186 and [Hempel(2007)] p 242 (at greater length) quote the Cholera Commission's report as acknowledging that water was the *vehicle* of contamination, but not the ultimate cause:

The water was undeniably impure with organic contamination; and ... if, at the times of epidemic invasion there was operating in the air some influence which converts putrefiable impurities into a specific poison, the water of the locality ... would probably be liable to similar poisonous conversion. Thus, if the Broad Street pump did actually become a source of disease to persons dwelling at a distance ... this ... may have arisen, not in its containing choleraic excrements, but simply in the fact of its impure waters having participated in the atmospheric infection of the district.

Additional Evidence & Analysis – Index Case

Already compelling, Snow (& The Reverend Henry Whitehead, vicar of St Luke's church) did yet more

- Whitehead interviewed those who didn't die, to find out whether they drank from pump
 - If those who didn't die drank, evidence *against* water theory
 - Mortality: non-drinkers 1/10, drinkers 6/10
 - Trying to disprove theory & failing strengthens argument
- Whitehead identified *index case* at 40 Broad
 - Digging into pump showed leakage from 40 Broad into well



4.3 Drinkers vs Non-Drinkers and Survivorship Bias – 2x2 Contingency Analysis

Contents

Making Quantitative Comparisons

We see deaths clustered around Broad St pump – *But compared to what?*

I. Compared to other pumps, Broad St stands out

- All areas densely populated – problem with maps that reflect population

II. Mortality among those who drank (6/10) vs those who did not (1/10)

- Not in map – Whitehead's work for Vestry report

Comparison (1) helps identify Broad St, but not compare water vs miasma

- Could easily be miasma from pump

Comparison (2) helps disprove miasma

- Drinkers & non-drinkers would be equally at-risk from miasma
- Snow's theory and miasma predicted differently – miasma lost

Whitehead began his assault on the pump-contamination theory by examining a crucial

absence in Snow's original survey of the neighborhood. Snow had focused almost exclusively on the Soho residents who had perished in the outbreak, detecting that an overwhelming majority of them had consumed Broad Street water before falling ill. But Snow had not investigated the drinking patterns of the neighborhood residents who had survived the epidemic. If that group turned out to have drunk from the Broad Street pump at the same rate, then the whole basis for Snow's theory would dissolve. ... In the end, he [Whitehead] tracked down information on 497 residents of Broad Street, more than half the population that had lived there in the weeks before the outbreak. [Johnson(2007)] p. 173

Among the pump-water-drinking population, the rates of infection were along the lines that Snow had outline in his original survey: for every two Broad Street drinkers who were not affected, there were three who fell ill. That ratio seemed even more striking when you compared it to the infection rates among those who had not drunk from the well: only one in ten of that group had been seized with the cholera. [Johnson(2007)] p. 175

Drinkers vs Non-Drinkers and Survivorship Bias

Substantive problem, recognized by Rev. Whitehead (Snow confrere)

- Snow focused on deaths, not survivors
- What if rate of drinking were similar for those who *did not* fall ill?
- Classic case of potential *survivorship bias*: need to ensure not only those who did die did drink, but those who did not die did not drink

Rev. Whitehead collected data on 497 residents of **Broad Street** & their illness and drinking history

- Found few non-drinkers fall ill
- Strong association between drinking and illness
-
- Water theory survived this test – Miasma did not

Drinkers vs Non-Drinkers and Survivorship Bias

Extension to Snow: Modern Statistics: 2x2 Contingency Table

Contingency Table Analysis for Drinking versus Illness drinkersdetaildrinkersdetail

Actual Counts	Not ill	Yes ill	TOTAL	Expected Counts	Not ill	Yes ill	TOTAL
No drink	279	20	299	No drink	226.3	72.7	299
Yes drink	57	88	145	Yes drink	109.7	35.3	145
TOTAL	336	108	444	TOTAL	336	108	444

Fewer non-drinkers and more drinkers fall ill than expected if independent

- Statistical tests strongly reject independence (Pearson χ^2 and Fisher exact p -value far less than .01%)
- Phi coefficient (Cramér's V) +0.59 – strong association drinking & illness
- Formalizing with statistics strengthens Snow's argument (Contrary to Freedman's claim against statistics)

Water Supported, Miasma Refuted by Contingency Table

Put water against data that could reject, but find strong association

- Strong water association hard for miasma theory
 - Need miasma & smells to be strongly associated with drinking
 - Not logically impossible, but highly improbable

Evidence so far does not prove water-borne theory, but very supportive

- Omitted (confounding) variables logically possible
 - Something *associated* with water that causes cholera
- But hard to imagine

And alternatives theories (miasma, class, elevation, ...) not looking good

5 South London “Grand Experiment”

Contents

“Grand Experiment” – Water Supply Changes

Two water companies served south London – Southwark & Vauxhall Co and Lambeth Co. – 486,936 customers, 300,000 **intimately mixed**

- In 1830s & 1840s companies competed for customers, often on same street

In many cases a single house has a supply different from that on either side. Each company supplies both rich and poor, both large houses and small; there is no difference in the condition or occupation of the persons receiving the water of the different companies. (Snow 1855 p 75)

1849 epidemic

- Both companies drew water from low in the Thames – near Vauxhall bridge

1852

- Lambeth Company moved source to Thames Ditton (upstream of London)
- In response to Act of Parliament, requiring move (by 1855)

1854 epidemic

- Southwark & Vauxhall Co supplied dirty water
- Lambeth Co supplied cleaner water

[Customers] were divided into two groups without their choice, and, in most cases, without their knowledge; one group being supplied water containing the sewage of London, and amongst it, whatever might have come from the cholera patients, the other group having water quite free from such impurity. (Snow 1855 p 75)

Explanation of the south London “Grand Experiment”


- I. Two water companies, Southwark & Vauxhall Co and Lambeth Co. In 1852 Lambeth changed its water source from lower Thames (polluted with sewage and subject to infection with cholera) to upper Thames (not polluted)

- II. They served south London, part jointly, part separately (see [Snow(1855)]p. 68)
- III. Seems that that Snow discovered this almost accidentally, in a note to the “Weekly Register of Births & Deaths”: “a footnote in the November 26 [1849?] edition of the *Weekly Returns*. Below the cholera deaths for South London, Farr had appended this seemingly innocuous line” ‘In three cases ... the same districts are supplied by two companies.’” [Johnson(2007)] p. 160
- IV. Can compare 1849 vs 1854 cholera outbreaks (treated vs untreated – a form of diff-in-diff), and in 1854 compare Southwark vs Lambeth in joint area (a form of randomized treatment)

South London Analysis – 2 Parts

Aggregate, Diff-in-Diffs

- Aggregate regions
- 1849 vs 1854
- Treated (clean) vs untreated (dirty)




Mixed or quasi-random comparison

- Snow visited all houses (deaths) for seven weeks ending Aug 26
- Determined supplier – by bill or chloride test


Registration Districts & Sub-Districts – Need to keep straight

- Deaths collected weekly by Registrar-General, by Registration District & Sub-District
- In this region of South London, 32 sub-districts
 - “First 12” – Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co only – dirty water 1849 & 1854
 - “Next 16” – Joint Southwark & Vauxhall Co and Lambeth Water Co – 1849 dirty water, 1854 part dirty (Southwark) & part clean (Lambeth)
 - “Final 4” – Lambeth Water Co only – not relevant, not supplied in 1849

Locations of Events & Data



Locations of Events & Data



Learning From South London – Statistics & Methodology Experimental Design & Control for Omitted Variables

Early examples of two widely-used & valuable methodologies / designs

- Difference-in-differences: Exploit control vs treatment comparison
 - Use over-time comparison to control for confounding factors
 - Widely-used when experiment and randomization not possible
- Randomization & Mixing: Randomized Control Trial
 - Mixing by age, sex, class, income – controls for confounders

If clean vs dirty water shows big effect, hard to argue confounded by other factors

- Does not prove causality, but rules out many (most) other causes

Statistical Methodology – Careful Error Analysis

Tempted to take large sample (400,000) as evidence of statistical significance

- Naive analysis (for DiD): t -ratio 11.7. Actually, closer to 2.0
- Using observed variation: what Stigler calls “intercomparison” (from Galton)

Extends Freedman (1991) idea to using statistical technique in concert with “good design, relevant data, and testing predictions against reality in a variety of settings.”

5.1 Difference-in-Differences

Contents

Snow’s “Before-vs-After” Comparison

Christchurch, Southwark	256	113	Lambeth Company, and Southwark and Vauxhall Compy.
Kent Road . . .	267	174	
Borough Road . . .	312	270	
London Road . . .	257	93	
Trinity, Newington . . .	318	210	
St. Peter, Walworth . . .	446	388	
St. Mary, Newington . . .	143	92	
Waterloo Road (1st) . . .	193	58	
Waterloo Road (2nd) . . .	243	117	
Lambeth Church (1st) . . .	215	49	
Lambeth Church (2nd) . . .	544	193	
Kennington (1st) . . .	187	303	
Kennington (2nd) . . .	153	142	
Brixton . . .	81	48	
Clapham . . .	114	165	
St. George, Camberwell	176	132	
Norwood . . .	2	10	Lambeth Company only.
Streatham . . .	154	15	
Dulwich . . .	1	—	
Sydenham . . .	5	12	
First 12 sub-districts . . .	2261	2458	Southwk. & Vauxhall.
Next 16 sub-districts . . .	3905	2547	Both Companies.
Last 4 sub-districts . . .	162	37	Lambeth Company.

Death statistics collected by government

- 1849 & 1854
- Snow copied, then summed up by sub-district
- Three regions, based on *water supplier*: Southwark&Vauxhall Co., Southwark Co. + Lambeth Co., Lambeth Co.

Exploit important fact:

- In 1852 (between 1849 & 1854) Lambeth changed to clean water – change in “treatment”

Summarizing “Before-vs-After” Comparison

[Table XII] exhibits an increase of mortality in 1854 as compared with 1849, in the sub-districts supplied by the Southwark and Vauxhall Company only, *whilst there is a considerable diminution of mortality in the sub-districts partly supplied by the Lambeth Company.* (Snow p 89)

Population & Mortality (Counts), 1849 & 1854, Snow Table XII & Table VIII

	1851 Population	1849 Deaths	1854 Deaths
First 12 (Southwark & Vauxhall Water Company Only)	167,654	2,261	2,458
Next 16 (Joint Southwark & Vauxhall and Lambeth Companies)	300,149	3,905	2,547
TOTAL	467,803	6,166	5,005

We can sharpen, considerably, tabulating as Diff-in-Diffs in rates (or log rates)

- Not sure why Snow didn’t express as rates

Better: Difference-in-Differences (1849 vs 1854)

Mortality per 10,000 Persons, 1849 & 1854, Snow Table XII & Table VIII DiDdetailsDiDdetails

Region or Sub-District Subtotals (Supplied by)	1849 Before	1854 After	Diff Before vs After
First 12 (Southwark & Vauxhall Co Only) – Dirty	134.9	146.6	+11.8
Next 16 (Joint Southwark & Vauxhall and Lambeth Cos) – Dirty / Clean	130.1	84.9	-45.2
Diff Water Supply Co.: Next 16 less First 12	-4.8	-61.8	-57.0

- Difference across regions to remove (“control for”) regional differences
 - Diff in 1849 tells us “before treatment” difference: only -5
- Difference across time to remove (“control for”) time differences
 - Diff for “First 12” shows pure time difference: +12
- Evidence that confounding factors not very important
- Difference the differences to produce *treatment effect*
 - Treatment effect = -57
 - Big reduction in mortality

Seems to support Snow’s claim for “the overwhelming influence which the nature of the water supply exerted over the mortality” (1856 p248)

Rules Out Most Everything Except Water

Logic (mixing) and Data (1849) show “First 12” and “Next 16” similar

- Mixing: houses close and similar so miasma, elevation, weather, income, age, social class similar
- 1849: rates close when everyone gets dirty water

Rules out all those unobserved factors as causing differences in mortality rates

- If those factors similar should not cause differences
- 1849 shows no big differences in rates

Change water, now see difference

- 1854 different for “Next 16”

Doesn’t “prove” water causes cholera, but hard to think of other explanations

Naive Error Analysis for Difference-in-Differences – Wrong

Like to think: sample of 467,864 overall \Rightarrow result is statistically significant

- Rates should be Binomial \rightarrow Normal, so diff in column or row should have

$$SE(r1 - r2) = \sqrt{r1(1-r1)/n1 + r2(1-r2)/n2}$$

Mortality per 10,000 Persons & Naive Error Analysis, 1849 & 1854

	1849 Deaths per 10,000	1854 Deaths per 10,000	Diff 1854 less 1849	Std Err of Diff	t-ratio
First 12 (Southwark & Vauxhall Water Company Only)	134.9	146.6	+11.8	4.07E-04	2.9
Next 16 (Joint Southwark & Vauxhall and Lambeth Companies)	130.1	84.9	-45.2	2.66E-04	-17.0
Diff Water Supply Co.: Next 16 less First 12	-4.8	-61.8	-57.0	4.86E-04	-11.7
Standard Error of Difference	3.49E-04	3.38E-04	4.86E-04		
t-ratio	-1.4	-18.3	-11.7		

But this is *wrong*: t-ratio of 11.7 is wrong, and actually closer to 2.0

- Variation across sub-districts & time imply rates & counts *not* Binomial

More detail on Difference-in-Differences: DiDdetailsDiDdetails

5.2 Mixing & Randomization

Contents

Mixing – Quasi-Randomized Control Trial

Registrar-General recorded deaths weekly by sub-district – but not *water supplier*

- 16 sub-Districts (pop 300,149) mixed between Southwark Co & Lambeth Co

In many cases a single house has a supply different from that on either side. Each company supplies both rich and poor, both large houses and small; there is no difference in the condition or occupation of the persons receiving the water of the different companies. (Snow 1855 p 75)

During August Snow visited every house with a death to identify supplier

- The design provides close to random mixing
- Snow’s data collection provided the needed data on deaths by supplier
- Randomization allows control for any and all non-water characteristics

Snow needed population-at-risk – Best he could do in 1855 was houses, aggregate, for Southwark Co vs Lambeth Co

Snow’s “Shoe Leather” Work

Tabulated, for each sub-district, deaths by water source

Sub-Districts.	Population in 1851.	Deaths from Cholera in the seven weeks ending 26th August.	Water Supply.				
			Southwark & Vauxhall.	Lambeth.	Pump-wells.	River Thames and ditches.	Unascertained.
*St. Saviour, Southwark	19,709	125	115	—	—	10	—
*St. Olave, Southwark	8,015	53	43	—	—	5	—
*St. John, Horsleydown	11,360	51	48	—	—	3	—
*St. James, Bermondsey	18,899	123	102	—	—	21	—
*St. Mary Magdalen	13,934	87	83	—	—	4	—
*Leather Market	15,295	81	81	—	—	—	—
*Rotherhithe	17,805	103	68	—	—	35	—
*Battersea	10,560	54	42	—	4	8	—
Wandsworth	9,611	11	1	—	2	—	—
Putney	5,280	1	—	—	1	—	—
*Camberwell	17,742	96	96	—	—	—	—
*Peckham	19,444	59	59	—	—	—	—

Snow’s Comparison Using Houses for all

- Includes “first” “next 16” mixed
- But – from different

Houses, Deaths, and M

Water

Southwark
Lambeth
Reduced
Naive

Note that this co
Huge decrease – mo
Naive t-ratio -29.2,

- Still large, just

$SE(r_1 - r_2) = \sqrt{r_1(1-r_1)/n_1 + r_2(1-r_2)/n_2}$. Here $r_1=.03154$, $n_1=40,046$, $r_2=.00375$, $n_2=26,107$, so that $SE=.000952 \Rightarrow$ t-ratio = $-.02779/.000952 = -29.2$

5.3 Detailed Error Analysis

Contents

Error Process / Statistical Model for Diff-in-Diffs

Naive error analysis is wrong

Mortality per 10,000 Persons & Naive Error Analysis, 1849 & 1854

	1849 Deaths per 10,000	1854 Deaths per 10,000	Diff 1854 less 1849	Std Err of Diff	t-ratio
First 12 (Southwark & Vauxhall Water Company Only)	134.9	146.6	+11.8	4.07E-04	2.9
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Diff Water Supply Co.: Next 16 less First 12	-4.8	-61.8	-57.0	4.86E-04	-11.7
Standard Error of Difference	3.49E-04	3.38E-04	4.86E-04		
t-ratio	-1.4	-18.3	-11.7		

Why? Large variation across and within sub-districts (mortality per 10,000)

- Some increased, some decreased (even for Southwark-only supply)

	Sub-Districts	1849	1854	Water Supplier
1	St. Saviour, Southwark	144	188	SouthwarkVauxhall
8	Battersea	92	56	SouthwarkVauxhall

Error Process / Statistical Model for Diff-in-Diffs

	Sub-Districts	1849	1854	Water Supplier
1	St. Saviour, Southwark	144	188	SouthwarkVauxhall
8	Battersea	92	56	SouthwarkVauxhall

Exploit this variation to assess precision of our -57.0 estimate (-0.511 in logs)

- Stigler's "intercomparison" (from Galton)

Need Statistical Model that maps our problem to usable mathematical framework

- Our problem: individuals at risk of infection & death
- Statistical Model 1: probability of infection (death) generated by Poisson process (approx to Binomial)
 - Generates counts (deaths) Poisson-distributed
 - Variance = mean \Rightarrow Std Dev of rate \downarrow as Population \uparrow
 - For large population, rate has little variability – not what we see
- Statistical Model 2: prob Poisson, but sub-districts vary – still not enough
- Statistical Model 3: random variation (mixture) in Poissons, across sub-districts & time
 - Poisson mixture, Gamma mixing \Rightarrow Negative Binomial Counts (deaths)

Model 1: Poisson Same for All – Too Much Variation

Model 2: Poisson Varies by Sub-District – Still Too Much

Excess Variation (“Overdispersion”) Slightly Puzzling

Variation *across* sub-districts easy to understand


- Sub-districts characteristics (housing density, social class, ...) vary in ways that cause different mortality rates
- Easy to model: each sub-district has its own mean (fixed effect)

Variation *within* sub-districts harder – How can mortality *not* be Poisson?



- Poisson good approx for mortality process
- Even if individuals different Poisson rates, sum of Poissons still Poisson
- Why does mortality vary in (seemingly) random manner?

Artificial example: tea drinkers (immune)

- Sub-districts vary in fraction of tea drinkers, and thus mortality
- But price of tea changes 1849-to-1854
- Sub-district changes appear random



Model 3: Negative Binomial – Enough Variation



This statistical model “works” – consistent with data

DiD Poisson Regressions – Inference (SEs) Wrong

	1 Poisson	2 Poisson, sub-district Fixed Effects	3 Negative Binomial	4 Negative Binomial, 2 Lambeth Effects
Single Treatment	-0.511	-0.511	-0.500	-0.338
standard error	0.039	0.039	0.246	0.248
z-ratio (coeff/SE)	-13.20	-13.20	-2.03	-1.36
Robust z-ratio	-2.43	-2.18	-2.17	-1.40
“More Lambeth” Treatment				-1.132
standard error				0.353
z-ratio (coeff/SE)				-3.20
Robust z-ratio				-3.84
Joint region (single control*)	-0.036		-0.032	-0.064
Joint region (more Lambeth) control*				0.059
Time control*	0.084	0.084	0.057	0.057
Residual Deviance	1541.6	456.8	59.8	60.0
p-value	0.00%	0.00%	21.45%	15.74%
theta (Gamma “size”)			4.96	5.57
Pseudo- R^2	24.2%	77.5%	16.8%	25.1%

Deaths by sub-district from 1849 and 1854 for the 28 sub-districts (“first 12” Southwark-only and “next 16” jointly-supplied) shown in [Snow(1855)] Table XII, with population from Snow’s Table VIII. Total 56 observations.

- Throw out Poisson & Poisson FE models – standard errors and inference wrong
- Estimates OK (-0.511 same as “by hand” in logs)

DiD Negative Binomial – Single Treatment Marginal

	1 Poisson	2 Poisson, sub-district Fixed Effects	3 Negative Binomial	4 Negative Binomial, 2 Lambeth Effects
Single Treatment	-0.511	-0.511	-0.500	-0.338
standard error	0.039	0.039	0.246	0.248
z-ratio (coeff/SE)	-13.20	-13.20	-2.03	-1.36
Robust z-ratio	-2.43	-2.18	-2.17	-1.40
“More Lambeth” Treatment				-1.132
standard error				0.353
z-ratio (coeff/SE)				-3.20
Robust z-ratio				-3.84
Joint region (single control*)	-0.036		-0.032	-0.064
Joint region (more Lambeth) control*				0.059
Time control*	0.084	0.084	0.057	0.057
Residual Deviance	1541.6	456.8	59.8	60.0
p-value	0.00%	0.00%	21.45%	15.74%
theta (Gamma “size”)			4.96	5.57
Pseudo- R^2	24.2%	77.5%	16.8%	25.1%

Deaths by sub-district from 1849 and 1854 for the 28 sub-districts (“first 12” Southwark-only and “next 16” jointly-supplied) shown in [Snow(1855)] Table XII, with population from Snow’s Table VIII. Total 56 observations.

- Single Treatment Effect Only Marginally Significant
- Some sub-districts more Lambeth Co. customers – when split, get significance (-1.132 or factor of 3)

Same for Quasi-Randomized: Poisson Doesn't Fit

Poisson and Negative Binomial Regressions for Sub-District Mixing, Seven Weeks Ending 26th August

	1 Poisson	2 Poisson, District Fixed Effects	3 Negative Binomial	4 Negative Binomial + Housing Density
Lambeth (treatment)	-2.101	-2.027	-2.099	-2.097
Effect				
standard error	0.104	0.107	0.194	0.177
z-ratio (coeff/SE)	-20.15	-18.93	-10.84	-11.86
Robust z-ratio	-9.87	-6.90	-8.56	-9.20
Housing Density				0.215
z-ratio (coeff/SE)				2.07
Robust z-ratio				1.24
Residual Deviance	114.9	11.8	18.2	17.3
p-value	0.00%	6.69%	19.60%	18.75%
theta (Gamma "size")			12.08	16.42
Pseudo- R^2	86.4%	98.5%	85.9%	89.3%

Data on deaths by District and by supplier (Southwark & Vauxhall Co versus Lambeth Co)

- Reject Poisson (see "Residual Deviance")
- Less data (no "across-time") so harder to decide on "Poisson FE" model 2, but probably no
- Negative Binomial: Treatment effect very large (-2.1 or factor of 8), even if include housing density

Conclusion: Treatment Effect Survives, But not Simple

- I. The "Treatment Effect" of being a Lambeth Co. customer and getting clean water is statistically & substantively very significant
 - But getting there is not easy
 - Simple Binomial / Poisson assumption (standard for clinical trials) is rejected
 - Need to broaden our thinking to random variation in mortality rates
 - But – will be less important for small samples, where small-sample Poisson variation dominates
- II. Some confidence that this result carries over to other regions, other periods
 - DiD shows no large variation (in aggregate) over time
 - Treatment effect survives observed variation across sub-districts (Stigler's *intercomparison*) so more likely to survive in other parts of London

Variance of Poisson is *count* so variance of rate is $count/n^2 = rate/n$. Variance of Negative Binomial $count + count^2/\theta$ so the variance of the rate is $rate/n + rate^2/\theta$. For the sample sizes we are dealing with (say sub-district rates 0.02 and populations 15,000, $\theta = 5.0$) this gives

$$SD_{Poiiss} = \sqrt{\frac{r}{n}} = \sqrt{\frac{.02}{15,000}} = .0012; SD_{NB} = \sqrt{\frac{r}{n} + \frac{r^2}{\theta}} = \sqrt{\frac{.02}{15,000} + \frac{.0004}{5}} = .0090$$

so that the Negative Binomial is 7.5-times larger.

For small sample sizes, say 200,

$$SD_{Poiiss} = \sqrt{\frac{r}{n}} = \sqrt{\frac{.02}{200}} = .010; SD_{NB} = \sqrt{\frac{r}{n} + \frac{r^2}{\theta}} = \sqrt{\frac{.02}{15,000} + \frac{.0004}{5}} = .013$$

so that the Negative Binomial is 1.3-time larger.

Supporting and Extending David Freedman's Comments

This detailed analysis of Snow's work supports Freedman's (1991) comments about Snow:

Snow's work is ... a success story for scientific reasoning based on nonexperimental data

statistical technique can seldom be an adequate substitute for good design, relevant data, and testing predictions against reality in a variety of settings,

But it modifies Freedman's skepticism about statistical arguments

I do not think that regression can carry much of the burden in a causal argument, [and] Arguments based on statistical significance of coefficients seem generally suspect.

to a more nuanced view: Snow's work proves the importance of marrying good design with good statistical analysis

[Freedman(1999), Freedman(1991)] discusses Snow's work with particular focus on the methodology, arguing that "Snow's work is ... a success story for scientific reasoning based on nonexperimental data." ([Freedman(1991)] p 291) Freedman also argues that "statistical technique can seldom be an adequate substitute for good design, relevant data, and testing predictions against reality in a variety of settings," ([Freedman(1991)] p 291) and that Snow's work provides a wonderful example of good design, relevant data, etc..


I have written this essay precisely to support and extend Freedman's assertion. Nonetheless I differ from Freedman on his somewhat negative view of the value of regression and other statistical tools ("I do not think that regression can carry much of the burden in a causal argument," and "Arguments based on statistical significance of coefficients seem generally suspect." ([Freedman(1991)] p 292)

6 Conclusion


Contents

Conclusion: Theory, Data, Hypothesis Testing


Data or Evidence Blocks



Theory & Hypotheses



Hypothesis or Testing Blocks



Theory, Data, Hypothesis Testing

Seven Step from Katz & Singer

- I. Divide evidence into blocks or types of evidence
- II. Assign to each block a *veritas* rating
 - Degree of dubiousness (strength of evidence - "appraisal of intrinsic ambiguity or likelihood")
 - 1-3, high, moderate, minimal distortion
 - Degree of fallacy ("appraisal of deception")
 - "the extent to which a piece of evidence was deceptive, misleading, or the result of unreliable reasoning"
 - 1, event probability low and evidence doubtful
 - 2, supporting information accurate but event low probability
 - 3, accepted evidence but doubted piece
 - 4, accepted all evidence as probably accurate
 - But for the cholera example, I think this less relevant and need to emphasize (4) below.
- III. Develop groups of hypotheses
- IV. Assess each evidence block for strength of association to each hypothesis
 - Strong, medium, weak
 - For Snow & cholera, think about inverting and making it about contradicting or refuting hypothesis (maybe strong, neutral, fail-to-refute)
 - Maybe need two dimensions?
 - Strength of evidence: strong, medium, weak (this is p-value for statistical tests)
 - Whether contradicts hypothesis or not (maybe strong, neutral, fail-to-refute)
- V. Organize evidence blocks by hypothesis into matrix
- VI. Choose strongest hypothesis
 - based on quality of evidence, quantity of evidence, strength of explanation based on evidence
 - each block assigned numerical score based on coding scheme (strength of association & veritas rating)
- VII. Strongest hypothesis checked
 - agreed with overall state of historical and scientific knowledge
 - satisfies guidelines for causation
 - consistent with any definitive proof or admission (not applicable for economic problems, I think)

Still Much to Learn From John Snow

- I. **Rollicking Good Tale** – full of heroism, death, and statistics
- II. **Causal Inference:** template for how to marshal evidence in support of a causal explanation
- III. **Statistics & Instruction:** The data are simple but the analysis demonstrates multiple data analytic tools we use today
 - combining maps and data (GIS or geographic information systems)
 - regression and error analysis
 - difference-in-differences regression
 - natural experiments and randomization

Snow's cholera work is also a humbling reminder of the sometimes meandering path towards truth: even with overwhelming evidence and strong analysis Snow failed to convince the medical establishment, the public, or the authorities

A Appendix Tables & Figures

A.1 Quantitative Analysis of Maps – Walking Neighborhoods

Contents

Major Innovation by Snow – Walking Neighborhood


Snow's version for the 1855 Vestry Report adds in “walking neighborhood”



- Shows all deaths “equal walking distance” to Broad St pump
- Carries on Tufte’s idea of “Quantitative Comparisons”
- Allows comparison of regions where pumps close or far
- Also, corrected pump position to 40 Broad St
- mapQuantReturnmapQuantReturn

Major Innovation by Snow – Walking Neighborhood

Detail showing the outline




- Shows all deaths “equal walking distance” to Broad St pump
- Neighborhood stretches out along streets
- Allows comparison of regions where pumps close or far

Building on Snow’s Neighborhoods - Voronoi

Fun with R Package “cholera”

Start with “Voronoi Neighborhoods”: Boundaries equidistant from pumps



- Examine how many deaths within Pump 7 region
- Versus other regions
- What about Pump 6? (Marlborough)
- Bad taste

Formalize Testing for “Actual vs Predicted”

Formal statistical testing of how many deaths in pump neighborhoods


pump.id	Count	Percent	Expected	Pearson
1	0	0	19.5	19.5
2	1	0.31	6.2	4.4
3	10	3.12	14.0	1.1
4	13	4.05	30.4	10.0
5	3	0.93	26.5	20.8
6	39	12.15	39.9	0.0
7	182	56.7	27.2	881.0
8	12	3.74	22.1	4.6
9	17	5.3	15.5	0.1
10	38	11.84	19.0	19.0
11	2	0.62	24.6	20.8
12	2	0.62	29.7	25.8
13	2	0.62	46.4	42.5
Sum	321		Sum Sq	1049.7

- “Expected” or “Predicted” is if deaths were even across the map
- “Pearson” is “Pearson’s chi-squared statistic”: $(act - exp)^2 / exp$
- Large sum means actual is not random

mapQuantReturnmapQuantReturn

Walking Neighborhoods

Even more fun – equal walking distance




- Examine how many deaths within Pump 7 neighborhood
- Versus other regions
- What about Pump 6? (Marlborough)
- Bad taste

Number of deaths in each “pump neighborhood”, calculated using the “neighborhoodWalking()” function of [Li()]

Walking Neighborhoods

Here are filled-in neighborhoods – put many cases on streets, figure out which pump is closest (by walking along street)



- Can use this to ask “how many deaths in a neighborhood?”
- Compare actual vs predicted

mapQuantReturnmapQuantReturn

```
plot(neighborhoodWalking(case.set = "expected"), type = "area.points")
```

Formalize Testing for “Actual vs Predicted”

Formal statistical testing of how many deaths in pump neighborhoods

pump.id	Actual	Expected	Pearson
1 - Market Place	0	23.0	23.0
2 - Adam and Eve Court	0	1.7	1.7
3 - Berners Street	12	19.3	2.8
4 - Newman Street	6	26.6	16.0
5 - Marlborough Mews	1	13.8	11.9
6 - Little Marlborough Street	44	55.8	2.5
7 - Broad Street	189	27.6	942.4
8 - Warwick Street	14	21.4	2.5
9 - Bridle Street	32	19.9	7.4
10 - Rupert Street	20	15.0	1.7
11 - Dean Street	2	25.0	21.2
12 - Tichborne Street	1	28.6	26.6
13 - Vigo Street	0	43.2	43.2
Sum	321	321	1102.8

- “Expected” or “Predicted” is if deaths were even across the map
- “Pearson” is “Pearson’s chi-squared statistic”: $(act - exp)^2 / exp$
- Large sum means actual is not random

mapQuantReturnmapQuantReturn


Analysis Using the “Voronoi Neighborhood” functions of [Li()]

pump.id	Count	Percent	Expected	Pearson
1	0	0	19.5	19.5
2	1	0.31	6.2	4.4
3	10	3.12	14.0	1.1
4	13	4.05	30.4	10.0
5	3	0.93	26.5	20.8
6	39	12.15	39.9	0.0
7	182	56.7	27.2	881.0
8	12	3.74	22.1	4.6
9	17	5.3	15.5	0.1
10	38	11.84	19.0	19.0
11	2	0.62	24.6	20.8
12	2	0.62	29.7	25.8
13	2	0.62	46.4	42.5
Sum	321		Sum Sq	1049.7

Number of deaths in each “pump neighborhood”, calculated using the “neighborhoodVoronoi()” function of [Li()]

The “Expected” counts are based on area of the Voronoi neighborhoods, assuming that deaths are uniformly distributed across the plane. The “Pearson” is $(\text{Count} - \text{Exp})^2 / \text{Exp}$ and the sum of squares should be distributed as chi-squared. (A sum of 1,050 is very large so there is essentially zero probability that the observed count would be observed if deaths were uniformly distributed.)

Broad St pump = “pump 7” and Marlborough St = “pump 6”




Analysis Using the “Walking Neighborhood” functions of [Li()]

Pump Number	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Number of Deaths	12	6	1	44	189	14	32	20	2	1
Excluding Pump 6	12	6	6		224	18	32	20	2	1


pump.id	Walking Count	Expected (4972)	Expected (normalized)	Pearson	Voronoi Count
1	0	356	23.0	23.0	0
2	0	27	1.7	1.7	1
3	12	299	19.3	2.8	10
4	6	412	26.6	16.0	13
5	1	214	13.8	11.9	3
6	44	865	55.8	2.5	39
7	189	428	27.6	942.4	182
8	14	331	21.4	2.5	12
9	32	308	19.9	7.4	17
10	20	232	15.0	1.7	38
11	2	388	25.0	21.2	2
12	1	443	28.6	26.6	2
13	0	669	43.2	43.2	2
Sum	321	4972	321	1102.8	321

Number of deaths in each “pump neighborhood”, calculated using the “neighborhoodWalking()” function of [Li()]

Broad St pump = “pump 7” and Marlborough St = “pump 6”



```
plot(neighborhoodWalking(case.set = "expected"), type = "area.points")
```



A.2 Broad Street Counts for Drinkers vs. Non-Drinkers

Contents

Counts for Drinkers vs Non-Drinkers

drinkersreturndrinkersreturn

Contingency Table Analysis for Drinkers vs Non-Drinkers

drinkersreturndrinkersreturn

A.3 More Detail for Difference-in-Differences

Contents

Writing Table With Variables

Region (Sub-Districts) Supplied by	1849 Deaths per 10,000	1854 Deaths per 10,000	Diff in Time
"First 12" Southwark Only	135	147	+12
"Next 16" Jointly Supplied	130	85	-45
Diff Joint less Southwark	-5	-62	-57

- Time Effect: δ_{54} captures any difference between 1849 & 1854
- Region Effect: γ_J captures any difference between "First 12" versus "Next 16"
- Treatment Effect: β captures the effect of clean water
- **We care about the treatment effect β**
- Worry about region (γ_J) and time (δ_{54}) effects
- Control by differencing – across *region* and across *time* ("difference-in-differences")

Region (Sub-Districts) Supplied by	1849 Deaths per 10,000	1854 Deaths per 10,000	Diff 1854 less 1849
"First 12" Southwark Only	μ	$\mu + \delta_{54}$	δ_{54}
"Next 16" Jointly Supplied	$\mu + \gamma_J$	$\mu + \gamma_J + \delta_{54} + \beta$	$\delta_{54} + \beta$
Diff Joint less Southwark	γ_J	$\gamma_J + \beta$	β

Write Difference-in-Differences as Equation

$$R_{rt} = \mu + \gamma_J \cdot I_{r=J} + \delta_{54} \cdot I_{t=54} + \beta \cdot I_{r=J} \cdot I_{t=54}$$

With appropriately chosen Indicators:

Region (Sub-Districts) Supplied by	1849 Deaths per 10,000	1854 Deaths per 10,000	Diff 1854 less 1849
"First 12" Southwark Only	$I_{r=J} = 0$ $I_{t=54} = 0$	$I_{r=J} = 0$ $I_{t=54} = 1$	
"Next 16" Jointly Supplied	$I_{r=J} = 1$ $I_{t=54} = 0$	$I_{r=J} = 1$ $I_{t=54} = 1$	
Diff Joint less Southwark			

Get same table:


Region (Sub-Districts) Supplied by	1849 Deaths per 10,000	1854 Deaths per 10,000	Diff 1854 less 1849
"First 12" Southwark Only	μ	$\mu + \delta_{54}$	δ_{54}
"Next 16" Jointly Supplied	$\mu + \gamma_J$	$\mu + \gamma_J + \delta_{54} + \beta$	$\delta_{54} + \beta$
Diff Joint less Southwark	γ_J	$\gamma_J + \beta$	β

DiDreturnDiDreturn

Graphing the Treatment Effect

Comparing the “Southwark Only” vs “Joint” regions:

- They look very similar in 1849 – γ_J small, looks like regions the same
- Useful – the regions look comparable. More confidence that the change in 1854 in the joint area is only due to water



Calculating Treatment Effect in Logs: -0.51, 1.67x

Usually want to compare *rates* in log (ratio) terms

- Rates cannot go negative
- Logs ensures we can't go negative

Equation becomes

$$\ln R_{rt} = \mu + \gamma_J \cdot I_{r=J} + \delta_{54} \cdot I_{t=54} + \beta \cdot I_{r=J} \cdot I_{t=54}$$

Table becomes

Region or Sub-Districts – Supplied by	1849 Death Rate (log)	1854 Death Rate (log)	Diff 1854 less 1849
First 12 – Southwark Only	$\ln(.0135) =$ -4.306	$\ln(.0147) =$ -4.223	0.084
Next 16 – Joint Southwark and Lambeth	$\ln(.0130) =$ -4.342	$\ln(.0085) =$ -4.769	-0.427
Diff Joint less Southwark	-0.036	-0.547	-0.511

-0.511 says (partially) clean water reduces death by 1.67x ($\exp(-0.511)$) DiDreturnDiDreturn

Mortality Rates from Cholera per 10,000 Persons in 1849 & 1854, Summary from Snow Table XII & Table VIII

A.4 Raw Mortality Rates for 1849 & 1854

Contents

Mortality Rates from Snow Table XII

SnowTableXIIreturnSnowTableXIIreturn

Mortality Rates from Snow Table XII

SnowTableXIIreturnSnowTableXIIreturn

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Table 3: Theory & Hypotheses by Evidence Block

	T1: Water	T2: Miasma	T3: Class, Elevation, ...	Comment
Albion	Contradict: no Strength: na	Contradict: yes Strength: strong	Contradict: neut Strength: na	
Broad 1 – mapping	Contradict: no Strength: med	Contradict: no Strength: med	Contradict: yes Strength: med	
Broad 2 – cases	Contradict: no Strength: strong	Contradict: yes Strength: strong	Contradict: neut Strength: na	
Broad 3 – contin table	Contradict: no Strength: strong	Contradict: yes Strength: med	Contradict: yes Strength: med	“medium” for T2&T3: maybe could produce correlation between water & miasma
S London 1 – DiDs	Contradict: no Strength: strong	Contradict: yes Strength: med	Contradict: yes Strength: med	“medium” for T2&T3: maybe could produce correlation between water & miasma
S London 2 – Mixing	Contradict: no Strength: strong	Contradict: yes Strength: strong	Contradict: yes Strength: strong	Rules out confounders, strengthens water causality

Table 6: Mortality Rates from Cholera per 10,000 Persons in 1849 & 1854 (from Snow Table XII & using population in 1851 from Table VIII)

	Sub-Districts	Deaths rates from Cholera in 1849, per 10,000	Deaths rates from Cholera in 1854, per 10,000	Water Supplier	Degree of Lambeth Supply
1	St. Saviour, Southwark	144	188	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
2	St. Olave, Southwark	196	201	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
3	St. John, Horsleydown	169	130	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
4	St. James, Bermondsey	132	192	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
5	St. Mary Magdalen	186	175	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
6	Leather Market	148	155	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
7	Rotherhithe	198	158	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
8	Battersea	92	56	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
9	Wandsworth	115	178	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
10	Putney	15	17	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
11	Camberwell	132	135	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
12	Peckham	47	89	SouthwarkVauxhall	dirty_none
13	Christchurch, Southwark	160	71	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	more_Lambeth
14	Kent Road	147	96	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
15	Borough Road	197	170	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
16	London Road	144	52	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	more_Lambeth
17	Trinity, Newington	152	100	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
18	St. Peter, Walworth	149	130	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
19	St. Mary, Newington	102	66	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
20	Waterloo Road (1st)	137	41	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	more_Lambeth
21	Waterloo Road (2nd)	132	64	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
22	Lambeth Church (1st)	117	27	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	more_Lambeth
23	Lambeth Church (2nd)	203	72	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
24	Kennington (1st)	77	125	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
25	Kennington (2nd)	81	75	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
26	Brixton	55	33	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
27	Clapham	70	101	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
28	St. George, Camberwell	111	83	SouthwarkVauxhall & Lambeth	less_Lambeth
29	Norwood	5	25	Lambeth	all
30	Streatham	171	17	Lambeth	all
31	Dulwich	6	0	Lambeth	all
32	Sydenham	11	27	Lambeth	all
	First 12 sub-districts	135	147	first12	dirty_none
	Next 16 sub-districts	130	85	next16	some
	Last 4 sub-districts	85	19	last4	all
	TOTAL	130	104		some